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with a particular choice.The frame that a decision-maker adopts is controlled partly
by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms,habits,and personal
characteristics of the decision-maker’.The wording used in Rubinstein’s survey puts
students into the role of a manager.The problem is that the potential effect of this
wording is not controlled for in Rubinstein’s paper.Do subjects only consider the
workers’welfare and the proﬁt of the company as Rubinstein suggests? Or do they
also think about what might happen to a manager who does not act in the interest
of the company’s owners? In order to clarify this point,we conducted a similar but
modiﬁed survey with students from the University of Cologne and the University of
Magdeburg in Germany and added a third question,which allows testing whether
the particular role inﬂuences subjects’choices.
The ﬁrst who reported a difference in the behaviour of economics students were
Marwell and Ames (1981).In a public good experiment they found that ﬁrst-year
graduate students of economics invested only half as much into the public good as
high-school students in a similar experiment.Subsequently several researchers
have also found economics students to behave more in line with standard game-
theoretic predictions than others,e.g.in the prisoners’dilemma (Frank et al.,1993;
James et al.,2001),in the ultimatum game (Carter and Irons,1991;Kahneman et al.,
1986a) or in the solidarity game (Selten and Ockenfels,1998;Ockenfels and
Weimann,1999).
Some authors have tried to pin down whether this difference is due to education or
to a self-selection bias – with mixed results.In a laboratory experiment on the
ultimatum game,Carter and Irons (1991) observe a difference regarding the amount
kept and regarding the acceptance thresholds between freshmen students of
economics and freshmen students of other ﬁelds.While this observation is in line
with a self-selection bias,the results reported by Frank et al.(1993) also point to an
effect of education.In particular,Frank et al.show that the rate of cooperative
behaviour in the prisoners’dilemma increases among students of other ﬁelds with
additional years of study while it stays almost constant for economics students.In
one of the few ﬁeld studies on the topic Frey and Meier (2003) analyse contributions
students can make to charitable funds of their university every semester.They ﬁnd
support for a self-selection effect,i.e.freshmen students of economics contribute
less than other freshmen students,but no evidence for an effect of education.Similar
results are obtained in a ﬁeld experiment on corruption conducted by Frank and
Schulze (2000).They report that,already at the beginning of their study,economics
students seem to be more prone to corruption than students of other ﬁelds.
Being a student of economics does not only affect strategic decision making,it also
seems to inﬂuence the evaluation of market outcomes.Drawing from a survey by
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Introduction
Ariel Rubinstein’s (2006) sceptical comment on the study of economics hits a nerve
with many economists who worry that what they teach and the way in which they
teach may indoctrinate students.Rubinstein conducted a survey in which students
had to decide whether to lay off workers,and thus meet a company’s goal of
making high proﬁts,or to ﬁre less,which results in lower proﬁts.In his survey,it
turned out that economists put,on average,a much higher weight on the
company’s proﬁt than non-economists.Rubinstein’s conjecture is that economics
students’‘views on economic issues are inﬂuenced by the way we teach,perhaps
without them even realizing it’.This is a serious accusation and our immediate
response to his article was astonishment.Is the way we teach really ﬂawed? There
are some big clouds of doubt that make us reluctant to follow Rubinstein’s
recommendation to consider changing our teaching methods.
Firstly,the fact that economists put more emphasis on proﬁt maximisation in a survey
may be attributed to a self-selection bias (i.e.economic studies attract certain types of
students) rather than indoctrination through teaching.As Rubinstein admitted,his
questionnaire did not allow for any conclusive evidence.It is thus important to
separate these effects before questioning the way we teach economics.
Secondly,it is a general phenomenon that the way a problem is framed can
substantially affect decisions (see,e.g.,the ﬁrst demonstration in Tversky and
Kahneman,1981,the surveys provided by Kühberger,1998,and Levin et al.,1998,or
the more recent studies by De Martino et al.,2006,and Deppe et al.,2005).As
deﬁned byTversky and Kahneman (1981,p.453),a decision frame refers to ‘the
decision-maker’s conception of the acts,outcomes,and contingencies associatedLaying Off or Not? The Influence of Framing and Economics Education
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cannot be ﬁred and 196 non-permanent workers who do the actual
extermination work and can be ﬁred.The company was founded ﬁve years
ago and is owned by three families.The work requires only a low level of
skills and so each worker requires only one week of training.All of the
company’s employees have been with the company for three to ﬁve years.
The company pays its workers more than the minimum wage.A worker’s
wage,which includes overtime,amounts to ¤20,000 p er year and exceeds
welfare beneﬁt payments.The company provides its employees with all the
beneﬁts required by law.
Until recently,the company was very proﬁtable.As a result of the recent
recession,however,there has been a signiﬁcant drop in proﬁts,although the
company is still in the black.You will attend a board meeting at which a
decision will be made as to how many workers to lay off.
Analogously to Rubinstein,the ﬁrst question was presented in two different ways.A
total of 339 economics and non-economics students received the following
information:
ILJK’s Finance Department has prepared the following forecast of annual proﬁts:
Number of workers who will Expected annual proﬁt 
continue to be employed in €millions
0 (all the workers will be laid off)  Loss of 8 
50 (146 workers will be laid off)  Proﬁt of 1 
65 (131 workers will be laid off)  Proﬁt of 1.5 
100 (96 workers will be laid off) Proﬁt of 2 
144 (52 workers will be laid off) Proﬁt of 1.6 
170 (26 workers will be laid off) Proﬁt of 1
196 (no layoffs) Proﬁt of 0.4
Of the 339 students 92 were economics students who had just started their ﬁrst
semester;91 were advanced undergraduate economists who had been studying for
at least two years.Of the non-economists 78 were in their ﬁrst semester and 78
were advanced undergraduates.The non-economists came from a variety of
subjects.The largest groups are students of science (15 per cent),engineering (12
per cent) and language and literature (11 per cent).Another 130 students who were
either advanced undergraduate economists or advanced undergraduate engineers
were informed that:
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Kahneman et al.(1986b),Ng (1988) provides some evidence for an education effect
in this particular task:there are more fourth-year students than ﬁrst-year students
of economics who regard the price system as a fair mean of allocating seats in a
crowded restaurant,although both groups of students regard it as fairer than do
ﬁrst-year science students or subjects drawn from the general population.In
another survey following Kahneman et al.(1986b),Freyet al.(1993) asked students
in an introductory economics course and advanced students of economics as to
how fair they regard hypothetical price increases for goods with increased demand.
They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference between the two groups,but both groups
perceived the price increases as fairer than subjects in a control group drawn from
the general population.In a recent study,Cipriani et al.(2009) build on this research
and ask students to judge the fairness of different allocation mechanisms and
market outcomes.In addition,they employ two questions from Rubinstein’s (2006)
questionnaire.Their observations suggest a difference between economics and
non-economics students in both kinds of decision tasks.While teaching
(micro-)economics seems to inﬂuence the perception of allocation mechanisms
and market outcomes,the answers given to the two questions from Rubinstein’s
(2006) questionnaire rather point to self-selection.Explaining their observations the
authors speculate that students of economics ‘may be especially sensitive to the
concept of an employee acting as an agent in the ﬁrm’s interests and therefore may
respond on this basis’(Cipriani et al.,p.7).
Our study takes up this speculation and investigates the role of framing and
economics education in more detail.In the next section we brieﬂy describe our
survey design and then discuss the main results before concluding.
Modifying Rubinstein’s questionnaire
We tried to design our survey in a way that,on the one hand,allows us to compare
our data with those generated by Rubinstein (2006),but,on the other hand,also
allows us to gain some more insights.In the ﬁrst two questions we followed
Rubinstein’s experimental design as closely as possible.In total 469 students who
earned  10 with a probability of 1/3 (every third answer was awarded) participated.
Students were recruited from a variety of classes taught at the universities of
Cologne and Magdeburg.We announced an online survey and handed out
participation codes which allowed students to access a speciﬁed web page.Each
code could be used only once and the codes were handed out anonymously.Cash
was the only incentive to participate.In the survey we asked the students to
consider the following situation:
Assume that you are vice president of the company ILJK.The company
provides extermination services and employs administrative workers whoLaying Off or Not? The Influence of Framing and Economics Education
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Following Rubinstein we decided to exclude those students from our analysis who
chose to employ less than 100 workers in at least one of the three questions.We
assume that these subjects mixed up the number of employed and laid-off
workers.We excluded 40 of 339 subjects in the table treatment,and 32 of 130
subjects in the formula treatment.Including these observations does not change
our results,however.
Table 2 compares the numbers of workers who are still employed after the
decisions of economists and non-economists using the table for all three questions.
In Q1 economists decided to employ signiﬁcantly fewer workers than non-
economists when their decision was made using the table.The difference between
International Review of Economics Education
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ILJK’s Finance Department has prepared a forecast of annual proﬁts
according to which the employment of x workers will result in annual
proﬁts of (in  millions):
In both treatments students had to state the number of workers they would
recommend to continue to employ (Q1).After that,we asked them to predict the
recommendation of a real vice president (Q2).Q1 and Q2 are identical to the
questions used by Rubinstein.
In contrast to Rubinstein,we asked a third question (Q3) in order to test how
answers are affected by the framing of the questions.Do students only consider the
workers’welfare and the proﬁt of the company? Or do they also think about their
own standing as the company’s vice president? Since it is not clear what students
have in mind when answering Q1,Q3 puts them into a situation in which they need
not care about their own future as vice president:
Assume that you are just before retirement and you only have this decision
left to make.What would be your recommendation?
AsTversky and Kahneman (1981) argue,not only the formulation of the problem
but also the habits,norms and characteristics of a decision maker may inﬂuence the
frame he or she adopts.While the table and formula above change the frame by
varying the formulation of the same problem,we also examine whether differences
in the answers to Q1 are due to a different conception of the vice president’s role.
Q3 alters the problem in a way that should not change the decision of an
indoctrinated student of economics,who would maximise proﬁts in both
questions.If the answers of economics students are driven by the perception that
the vice president is an agent of the company’s owners instead,we will observe
fewer layoffs in response to Q3 than to Q1.
Findings
The most interesting message of Rubinstein’s paper is that economists care more
about proﬁt maximisation than non-economists and that they do not think much
about the fate of the workers who lose their jobs.Table 1 compares the
observations for Q1 in the table treatment obtained in both surveys.For Q1,our
study reproduces the results of Rubinstein’s experiment.Our survey conﬁrms
Rubinstein’s observation that there are ‘sharp differences between the groups in
dealing with the dilemma of proﬁt maximisation vs.worker layoffs’(Rubinstein
2006,C3).The difference in the average number of layoffs chosen by economists
and non-economists is 20 in Rubinstein’s survey and 21 in our survey.
8 0,1 2 − − x x
Table 1:Data obtained in Q1 using the table
Hebrew/Tel Aviv Cologne/Magdeburg (Q1-Table)
Economists Non- Total Economists Non- Total
economists economists
n = 224 368 592 183 156 339
100 (proﬁt maximum) 47% 22% 31% 38% 15% 27%
101–195 40% 53% 48% 44% 52% 47%
196 (no layoffs) 10% 18% 15% 14% 29% 21%
Others 3% 7% 6% 4% 4% 4%
Average layoffs 66 46 53 61 40 51
Table 2:Average number of workers who will continue to be employed (table)
Q1-Table Q2-Table Q3-Table
Economists Non- Economists Non- Economists Non-
economists economists economists
n = 161 138 161 138 161 138
100 (proﬁt maximum) 40% 15% 64% 56% 23% 12%
101–195 45% 57% 34% 38% 40% 43%
196 (no layoffs) 15% 28% 2% 6% 37% 45%
Average layoffs 58 36 77 72 37 26
Mann-Whitney-U test 
(two-sided)  p = 0.000 p = 0.155 p = 0.014Laying Off or Not? The Influence of Framing and Economics Education
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Rubinstein points out that economics students show a much stronger tendency to
maximise proﬁts than subjects in other groups,but he could not determine clearly
whether differences were due to a self-selection bias or are the result of
indoctrination.Since he found (signiﬁcant?) differences between economics
students and MBA students trained in doing case studies,he tentatively concluded
that the difference might indeed be the result of the way in which economics is
taught at universities:‘the study of cases might stimulate more comprehensive
thinking about real life problems whereas the study of economics through
mathematical exercises conceals the need to balance between conﬂicting interests’
(Rubinstein 2006,C8).
To distinguish the self-selection bias from indoctrination,we compared decisions
made by ﬁrst-semester economics students and advanced undergraduate
economics students.Our results reveal that education does not signiﬁcantly matter
for economics students.Instead of becoming more interested in proﬁt
maximisation they even seem to learn to give the workers’welfare more weight –
although the increase of employment is not signiﬁcant.All of the advanced
undergraduates in our sample have been trained in microeconomics,therefore,
these results are in line with the ﬁndings on indoctrination by Cipriani et al.(2009).
Note that the education of non-economics students does not change their
behaviour either.Table 5 reports the results.
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economists and non-economists is no longer signiﬁcant concerning question Q2.
That is,both groups assess the behaviour of real managers in a similar way.Our
survey thus conﬁrms Rubinstein’s observation that there are ‘no signiﬁcant
differences between the groups as to what subjects thought a real vice president
would do’(Rubinstein 2006,C5).When close to retirement (Q3),economists still
decide to lay off signiﬁcantly more workers than non-economists,though the
average difference drops from 22 in Q1 to 11 in Q3.
This last observation leads to the question of whether the frame of the questions is
important.Remember that Q1 was presented in two different ways.While we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant differences between the decisions of economists and non-economists
working with the formula,there is a strong and signiﬁcant difference between the
two frames (Table 3).On average economists and non-economists let 149 workers
continue to work in the table frame whereas only 123 were not laid off in the
formula frame.This result also reproduces the ﬁndings obtained by Rubinstein.
Table 4 shows that with regard to Q3 the speciﬁc situation of the manager also
turns out to be of importance.Economists,in particular,employ signiﬁcantly more
workers when they are forced to imagine that they are near retirement,i.e.are in a
position in which their decision has far fewer personal consequences.Moreover,in
Q3,the average decision of those economists equipped with the table is no longer
signiﬁcantly different from the average decision of students equipped with the
formula.
Table 3:Average number of workers who will continue to be employed in Q1
Economists Non-Economists
Q1-Table Q1-Formula Q1-Table Q1-Formula
n = 161 70 138 28
100 (proﬁt maximum) 40% 70% 15% 61%
101–195 45% 17% 57% 32%
196 (no layoffs) 15% 13% 28% 7%
Average layoffs 58 72 36 74
Mann-Whitney-U test  Q1-Table vs.Q1-Formula Q1-Table vs.Q1-Formula
(two-sided) p = 0.004 p = 0.000
Q1-Formula:Economists vs.Non-Economists
p = 0.727
Table 4:Average number of workers who will continue to be employed in Q1 and Q3
Economists Non-Economists
Q1- Q3- Q3- Q1- Q3- Q3-
Table Table Formula Table Table Formula
n = 161 161 70 138 138 28
100 (proﬁt maximum) 40% 23% 30% 15% 12% 32%
101–195 45% 40% 33% 57% 43% 54%
196 (no layoffs) 15% 37% 37% 28% 45% 14%
Average layoffs 58 37 41 36 26 37
Wilcoxon test 
(two-sided)  Q1-Table vs.Q3-Table  Q1-Table vs.Q3-Table 
p = 0.000 – p = 0.000 –
Mann-Whitney-U test  – Q3-Table vs.Q3-Formula  – Q3-Table vs.Q3-Formula
(two-sided) p = 0.784 p = 0.000Laying Off or Not? The Influence of Framing and Economics Education
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students of other disciplines.The Rubinstein interpretation that economists
systematically put a higher weight on proﬁt maximisation because they are trained
to solve economic problems with the help of formal models is not coactive.
The different individual interpretations of a particular problem might also explain
some of the conﬂicting results in the literature.Presenting some of the questions
used in the original survey from Kahneman et al.(1986b),Gorman and Kehr (1992)
already suppose that business executives might interpret the fairness of economic
decisions very differently.
Another,more general question is how to interpret the observation that students of
economics seem to care more about proﬁt maximisation.The efficient use of
resources is a core topic in economics and we emphasise this point over and over
again.We also stress that markets can (under certain circumstances) do a good job
in achieving efficiency and we should,therefore,not be surprised that students of
economics might perceive the social cost of ﬁring workers lower than others do.It
should be no surprise when both groups,on average,do not ﬁnd the same answer.
By no means can we infer an indoctrination bias from that outcome.An elaborate
discussion of this question is far beyond the scope of this paper,however,and
leaves much room for future work.
Note
2 There may be another cause for a different conception of the problem.Because of
the hypothetical nature of the situation in which the students were asked,students
might tend to answer based not on their own preferences,but rather what they
believe to be the correct answer.Economics students might be more inclined to pick
the answer they believe to be correct in terms of economic analysis,irrespectively of
their moral beliefs.Only changes in these beliefs would reﬂect indoctrination
through economic education.
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